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Abstract—In this paper, power control in the uplink for two-
tier small-cell networks is investigated. We formulate the power
control problem as a Stackelberg game, where the macrocell
user equipment (MUE) acts as the leader and the small-cell
user equipment (SUEs) act as the followers. To reduce the cross-
tier and co-tier interferences and the power consumptions of
both the MUE and SUEs, we propose optimizing not only the
transmit rate but also the transmit power. The corresponding
optimization problems are solved through a two-layer iteration.
In the inner iteration, the SUEs compete with each other, and
their optimal transmit powers are obtained through iterative
computations. In the outer iteration, the optimal transmit power
of the MUE is obtained in a closed form based on the transmit
powers of the SUEs through proper mathematical manipulations.
We prove the convergence of the proposed power control scheme,
and we also theoretically show the existence and uniqueness of
the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) in the formulated Stackelberg
game. The simulation results show that the proposed power
control scheme provides considerable improvements, particularly
for the MUE.
Index Terms—Small-cell networks, power control, Stackelberg
game, Stackelberg equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of the global communications
industry, the problem of high energy consumption of commu-
nications systems is becoming increasingly more serious, and
determining how to effectively improve the energy efficiency
of the entire network is becoming increasingly more urgent.
The introduction of small cells can greatly reduce the energy
consumption of the entire network. Furthermore, because
small cells have small cell radii with small base stations
(SBSs) deployed closer to users and because short-distance
transmissions have smaller path loss and fading compared
to long-distance transmissions, the throughput of the entire
network can be increased. Therefore, the energy efficiency of
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the entire two-tier small-cell network, which is composed of
macrocells and a large number of small cells, can be greatly
improved [1]. To improve the spectral efficiency, small cells
can share the spectrum with macrocells; however, the co-tier
and cross-tier interferences will seriously degrade the system
performance due to the sharing of the spectrum. In this regard,
proper power control in small-cell networks is required to
reduce the interference and the power consumption.
Power control is an important research topic that has been
widely investigated in the literature [2]–[5]. In two-tier small-
cell networks, small cells can be deployed randomly and
freely, and game theory has increasingly been used to achieve
distributed power control [6], [7]. In [8], the interference
dynamics caused by time-varying environment was considered
and a robust mean field game was proposed to control the
transmit power of SBSs. In [9]–[11], it was shown that
a Stackelberg game can provide a suitable framework for
modeling the competition in two-tier networks. Specifically,
a power control problem was formulated to maximize energy
efficiency with minimal information exchange in [9]. In [10],
both uniform and non-uniform pricing schemes were proposed
to obtain the optimal resource allocation with a tolerable
interference power constraint. In [11], a network interference
controller was proposed to minimize the sum interference by
pricing the power consumptions. However, most of the existing
literature only addressed power control in the downlink and
ignored power control of both small-cell user equipment
(SUEs) and macrocell user equipment (MUE) in the uplink.1
Moreover, because most of the existing literature addressed
power control through a price-based Stackelberg game, they
can determine the optimal price and power control for only
one type of device. Therefore, if we formulate the power
control problem through a Stackelberg game without pricing,
the optimal power control for the two types of UEs in the
considered two-tier small-cell networks can be determined
simultaneously.
Motivated by the aforementioned discussions, we develop
a power control scheme taking both SUEs and MUE into
account. First, the power control problem of the considered
two-tier small-cell networks is mathematically formulated as
a Stackelberg game that consists of one leader and multiple
followers. Second, the optimization problem is solved through
a two-layer iteration. In the inner iteration, the followers
compete with each other, and their optimal transmit powers are
1Note that the UE served by an SBS is called SUE, and the UE served by
an MBS is called MUE.
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2obtained through iterative computations. In the outer iteration,
the optimal transmit power of the leader is calculated based
on the transmit powers of the followers. Then, we theoreti-
cally show the convergence of the proposed scheme and the
existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE)
in the Stackelberg game. Finally, our proposed power control
scheme is verified through simulations, showing that it greatly
improves the performance of the MUE.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, the system model of the considered two-tier small-
cell networks is presented. In Section III, the proposed power
control scheme via a Stackelberg game is developed. The sim-
ulation results are presented in Section IV. Final conclusions
are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the two-tier small-cell network shown in Fig. 1,
which consists of one macrocell and K small cells. Assume
that the macro base station (MBS) and SBSs share the same
spectrum and that only one UE communicates with each
BS at any time. In the uplink, each SBS will experience
interference from the MUE and its nearby SUEs, and the
MBS will experience interference from its nearby SUEs. Let
P0 denote the transmit power of the MUE served by the
MBS, Pk denote the transmit power of the kth SUE, and
p = [P1, P2, · · · , Pk, · · · , PK ]T denote the transmit power
vector of the considered K SUEs. Then, the transmit rate of
the MUE served by the MBS can be expressed as follows:
R0(P0,p) = ln
1 + H00P0
N0+
K∑
k=1
H0kPk
 , (1)
where H00 denotes the channel gain from the MUE to its
corresponding MBS, H0k is the interference channel gain
from the kth SUE to the MBS, and N0 is the noise power.
The transmit rate of the SUE served by the kth SBS can be
expressed as follows:
Rk(Pk,p−k, P0)
Fig. 1. The schematic of the considered two-tier small-cell
network.
= ln
1 + HkkPk
N0+Hk0P0+
K∑
k′ 6=k,k′=1
Hkk′Pk′
 , (2)
where p−k denotes the transmit power vector of the K − 1
other SUEs and p−k = [P1, P2, · · · , Pk−1, Pk+1, · · · , PK ],
Hkk is the channel gain from the kth SUE to its corresponding
SBS, Hk0 is the interference channel gain from the MUE to
the kth SBS, and Hkk′ is the interference channel gain from
the k′th SUE to the kth SBS.
The design objective of this paper is to develop a power
control scheme that can increase the transmit rate with reduced
co-tier and cross-tier interferences and power consumption.
Moreover, this paper aims to achieve the above design objec-
tive for two-tier small-cell networks where there are two types
of UEs, i.e., MUE and SUE, and two different cell types, i.e.,
macro cell and small cell.
III. THE PROPOSED POWER CONTROL SCHEME VIA
STACKELBERG GAME
In this section, we propose a power control scheme for
two-tier small-cell networks based on a Stackelberg game,
which has one leader and multiple followers. In the formulated
Stackelberg game, the MUE, acting as the leader, is supposed
to make its own decision and maximize its utility with the best
responses of the followers, and the SUEs acting as the fol-
lowers will respond to the leader’s action and maximize their
utilities through a subgame [12]–[14]. Note that the transmit
power of the MUE or SUE is controlled by its corresponding
MBS or SBS and the MBS can control its corresponding
SBSs in the considered two-tier small-cell network. When the
transmit power of the MUE has been determined by the MBS,
this transmit power information will be sent from the MBS to
its corresponding SBSs. Therefore, the MUE controlled by
the MBS acts as the leader, and the SUEs controlled by its
corresponding SBSs act as the followers.
A. Stackelberg Game Formulation
From (1) and (2), we find that the transmit rate of the MUE
can be improved by increasing the transmit power of the MUE
but at the cost of increased cross-tier interference to the SUEs.
Likewise, the transmit rate of the SUEs can be improved by
increasing the transmit power of the corresponding SUE but
at the cost of increased cross-tier interference to the MUE
and increased co-tier interference to the other K − 1 SUEs.
To reduce the cross-tier and co-tier interferences and the
power consumptions of both the MUE and SUEs, we propose
optimizing not only the transmit rate but also the power
consumption. First, the leader MUE moves and determines
its transmit power. Subsequently, the follower SUEs move
and update their power control strategies to maximize their
individual utilities based on the MUE’s transmit power.
We define the utility function of the MUE as follows:
U0(P0,p) = R0(P0,p)− λ0P0, (3)
3where λ0 denotes the coefficient characterizing the influence
of per unit transmission power for MUE [15]. Then, the
optimization problem of the MUE can be expressed as follows:
max
P0
U0(P0,p),
s.t. 0 ≤ P0 ≤ PT ,
(4)
where PT denotes the maximum transmit power of the MUE
or SUEs.
We define the utility function of the kth SUE as follows:
Uk(Pk,p−k, P0) = Rk(Pk,p−k, P0)− λkPk, (5)
where λk denotes the coefficient characterizing the influence
of per unit transmission power for SUE. Then, the optimization
problem of the kth SUE can be expressed as follows:
max
Pk
Uk(Pk,p−k, P0),
s.t. 0 ≤ Pk ≤ PT ,∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K}.
(6)
The optimization problems in (4) and (6) lead to a Stackel-
berg game. In this game, the objective is to find the SE point
from which neither the leader nor the followers have incentives
to deviate. Just similar to the definition in [10], we define the
SE as follows.
Definition 1: Let P ∗0 and P
∗
k denote the two solutions
for the optimization problems in (4) and (6), respec-
tively. Let p∗ = [P ∗1 , P
∗
2 , · · · , P ∗k , · · · , P ∗K ]T and p∗−k =
[P ∗1 , P
∗
2 , · · · , P ∗k−1, P ∗k+1, · · · , P ∗K ]T . Then, (P ∗0 ,p∗) is an
SE point for the proposed Stackelberg game if the following
conditions are satisfied:
U0(P
∗
0 ,p
∗) ≥ U0(P0,p∗), (7)
Uk(P
∗
k ,p
∗
−k, P
∗
0 ) ≥ Uk(Pk,p∗−k, P ∗0 ). (8)
Generally, the SE for a Stackelberg game can be obtained by
finding its subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (NE) [10], [16].
In our proposed Stackelberg game, it can be readily seen that
the SUEs compete in a non-cooperative fashion. Therefore, a
non-cooperative power control subgame is formulated, where
the corresponding NE is defined as the operating point at
which no player can improve utility by changing its strategy
unilaterally [10].
To obtain the SE of the proposed Stackelberg game, we
propose exploiting the backward induction method [17] to
solve the above optimization problems. Generally, the follow-
ers’ best responses can be obtained with the fixed value given
by the leader, and then the optimal strategy of the leader
can be achieved according to the followers’ best responses.
Correspondingly, we can first solve the followers’ optimization
problem in (6). Then, by using the obtained solution, we can
solve the leader’s optimization problem in (4).
B. The Optimal Solution of the Followers’ Optimization Prob-
lem
We have the following theorem for the optimal solution of
the optimization problem in (6) for the followers.
Theorem 1: Given the transmit power of the MUE, the
optimization problem in (6) has a globally optimal solution,
as follows:
P˜ ∗k =

PT , P
tmp
k > PT ,
P tmpk , 0 < P
tmp
k ≤ PT ,
0, P tmpk ≤ 0,
(9)
or
P˜ ∗k = PT −
[
PT − (P tmpk )+
]+
, (10)
where (·)+ ∆= max(·, 0),
P tmpk =
1
λk
−
N0+Hk0P0+
K∑
k′ 6=k,k′=1
Hkk′Pk′
Hkk
, (11)
and P tmpk denotes the temporary value of the optimal transmit
power of the kth SUE.
Proof: As shown, the utility function Uk(Pk,p−k, P0) is
strictly concave. Furthermore, it can be verified that the SUEs’
strategy space is a non-empty and close-bounded convex set in
Euclidean space. Correspondingly, the optimization problem
in (6) can readily be proven to be convex; thus, it has a
globally optimal solution. By setting the first-order derivative
of Uk(Pk,p−k, P0) with respect to Pk to zero, P
tmp
k can
readily be calculated as shown in (11). By considering the
constraint 0 ≤ Pk ≤ PT , the optimal solution of the
optimization problem in (6) can readily be obtained as shown
in (9) or (10). This completes the proof.
C. The Optimal Solution of the Leader’s Optimization Prob-
lem
After some mathematical manipulations, we can obtain the
refined constraint for P0 according to (9) as follows:
Pmin0 ≤ P0 ≤ Pmax0 , (12)
where
Pmin0 = max
k∈{1,2,··· ,K}
Pmin0,k , (13)
Pmax0 = min
k∈{1,2,··· ,K}
Pmax0,k , (14)
and Pmin0,k and P
max
0,k are shown at the bottom of next page in
(15) and (16), respectively.
Define p˜∗ = [P˜ ∗1 , P˜
∗
2 , · · · , P˜ ∗k , · · · , P˜ ∗K ]T . Substituting (10)
into (3), and after some mathematical manipulations, we obtain
U0(P0, p˜
∗) = ln
1 + H00P0
N0+
K∑
k=1
H0kP˜
∗
k
− λ0P0,
= ln
1 + H00P0
N0+
K∑
k=1
H0k
{
PT −
[
PT − (P tmpk )+
]+}

− λ0P0,
4= ln
1 + H00P0
N0+
K∑
k=1
H0k
[
PT − ε′k · (PT − εk · P tmpk )
]

− λ0P0, (17)
where εk denotes the indicator function with εk = 1 if P
tmp
k >
0 and εk = 0 otherwise, and ε′k is the indicator function with
ε′k = 1 if PT − (P tmpk )+ > 0 and ε′k = 0 otherwise. After
some further manipulations, the optimization problem for the
leader in (4) can be reformulated as follows:
max
P0
U0(P0, p˜
∗) = max
P0
{
ln
(
1 +
H00P0
A−BP0
)
− λ0P0
}
,
s.t. Pmin0 ≤ P0 ≤ Pmax0 ,
(18)
where
A =N0+
K∑
k=1
H0k [PT − ε′kPT
+ε′kεk
 1λk −
N0+
K∑
k′ 6=k,k′=1
Hkk′ P˜
∗
k′
Hkk

, (19)
B =
K∑
k=1
ε′kεk
H0kHk0
Hkk
. (20)
Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2: If
K∑
k=1
εkε
′
k 6= 0, then the optimization problem
in (18) has an optimal solution as shown in (21) at the bottom
of this page, where
C1 = λ0B(H00 −B), (22)
C2 = λ0A(2B −H00), (23)
C3 = AH00 − λ0A2, (24)
P 10 =
−C2 +
√
C2
2 − 4C1C3
2C1
, (25)
P 20 =
−C2 −
√
C2
2 − 4C1C3
2C1
. (26)
Proof: If
K∑
k=1
εkε
′
k 6= 0, then B 6= 0. Take the first-order
derivative of U0(P0, p˜∗) with respect to P0. Then, we have
∂U0(P0, p˜
∗)
∂P0
=
AH00
(A−BP0)2 +H00P0(A−BP0)
− λ0. (27)
Set the above expression to zero. Then, we have
λ0B(H00 −B)P 20 + λ0A(2B −H00)P0 +AH00 − λ0A2
= C1P
2
0 + C2P0 + C3 = 0. (28)
If C22 − 4C1C3 < 0, then (28) has no solution. Correspond-
ingly, the objective function of the optimization problem in
(18) is definitely a monotonic function, and its solution must
be one of the two endpoints. Then, we have
P˜ ∗0 = arg max
{
U0(P
max
0 , p˜
∗), U0(Pmin0 , p˜
∗)
}
. (29)
If C22 − 4C1C3 ≥ 0, then we can obtain the two solutions
of (28), i.e., P 10 , P
2
0 . Since the objective function of the
optimization problem in (18) is a continuous function, its
solution must be among the extreme points and the endpoints.
Correspondingly, we have
P˜ ∗0 = arg max
{
U0(P
max
0 , p˜
∗), U0(Pmin0 , p˜
∗),
U0(P
1
0 , p˜
∗), U0(P 20 , p˜
∗)
}
. (30)
This completes the proof.
Pmin0,k =

0, P tmpk > PT ,
max
0,
(
1
λk
−PT
)
Hkk−N0−
K∑
k′ 6=k,k′=1
H
kk′ P˜
∗
k′
Hk0
 , 0 < P tmpk ≤ PT ,
max
0,
1
λk
Hkk−N0−
K∑
k′ 6=k,k′=1
H
kk′ P˜
∗
k′
Hk0
 , P tmpk ≤ 0,
(15)
Pmax0,k =

min
PT ,
(
1
λk
−PT
)
Hkk−N0−
K∑
k′ 6=k,k′=1
H
kk′ P˜
∗
k′
Hk0
 , P tmpk > PT ,
min
PT ,
1
λk
Hkk−N0−
K∑
k′ 6=k,k′=1
H
kk′ P˜
∗
k′
Hk0
 , 0 < P tmpk ≤ PT ,
PT , P
tmp
k ≤ 0.
(16)
P˜ ∗0 =
{
arg max
{
U0(P
max
0 , p˜
∗), U0(Pmin0 , p˜
∗)
}
, C2
2 − 4C1C3 < 0,
arg max
{
U0(P
max
0 , p˜
∗), U0(Pmin0 , p˜
∗), U0(P 10 , p˜
∗), U0(P 20 , p˜
∗)
}
, C2
2 − 4C1C3 ≥ 0, (21)
5Algorithm 1 The Proposed Power Control Scheme via Stack-
elberg Game
• Step 1: Initialization: m = 1, n = 1, P0(1), Pˆk(1) for
1 ≤ k ≤ K.
• Step 2: Update Pˆk(m) as follows:
Pˆk (m+ 1)
=
1
λk
−
N0+Hk0P0(n)+
K∑
k′ 6=k,k′=1
Hkk′ Pˆk′(m)
Hkk
,
and set m = m+ 1.
• Step 3: Repeat step 2 until the inner iteration converges.
• Step 4: According to (10), calculate the transmit power
of each SUE, P˜ ∗k , as follows:
P˜ ∗k = PT −
{
PT −
[
Pˆk(m)
]+}+
.
• Step 5: According to (21), calculate the transmit power
of the MUE, P˜ ∗0 (n+ 1), and set n = n+ 1.
• Step 6: Repeat steps 2 ∼ 5 until the outer iteration
converges.
D. The Proposed Power Control Scheme via Stackelberg
Game
We are now ready to develop the proposed power control
scheme based on the Stackelberg game described in Algorithm
1.2 In the proposed scheme, the MUE acts as the leader, the
SUEs act as the followers, and the Stackelberg game is formed
through the two-layer iteration. In the inner iteration, the SUEs
compete with each other, and their own transmit powers are
updated iteratively based on the transmit power of the MUE,
as shown in Theorem 1. In the outer iteration, the MUE
updates its own transmit power based on the transmit powers
of the SUEs, as shown in Theorem 2. In the proposed power
control scheme, each user plays the best response strategy
and maximizes its own utility function in each iteration given
the chosen transmit powers of the other users in the previous
iteration.
Let W denote a K ×K matrix whose elements are given
by
Wkk′ =
{ Hkk′
Hkk
, k 6= k′, 1 ≤ k, k′ ≤ K,
0, k = k′, 1 ≤ k, k′ ≤ K. (31)
Then, we can establish the following theorem for the conver-
gence of the inner iteration of the proposed scheme.
Theorem 3: If the matrix norm of W is not larger than 1,
i.e., ‖W ‖ ≤ 1, then the inner iteration of the proposed power
control scheme via a Stackelberg game as shown in Algorithm
1 converges.
2Note that our proposed scheme can always achieve the optimal solution
for any initial point. On the one hand, we analyze theoretically in Section
III-D that the convergence of the proposed scheme can always be guaranteed.
On the other hand, we will prove in Section III-E that one and only one SE
point exists for the proposed Stackelberg game.
Proof: Define
φk =P
tmp
k , (32)
φ(p) =[φ1, φ2, · · · , φk, · · · , φK ]T , (33)
µ =
[
1
λ1
,
1
λ2
, · · · , 1
λk
, · · · , 1
λK
]T
, (34)
ν =
[
N0 +H10P0
H11
,
N0 +H20P0
H22
, · · · ,
N0 +Hk0P0
Hkk
, · · · , N0 +HK0P0
HKK
]T
. (35)
Then, φ(p) can be expressed in a vector-matrix form as
follows:
φ(p) = µ− ν −Wp. (36)
Assume that ‖W ‖ ≤ 1. Then, we can obtain the following
relationship:
‖φ(p)− φ(p′)‖ = ‖W (p− p′)‖ (37)
≤ ‖W ‖ · ‖p− p′‖ (38)
≤ ‖p− p′‖ (39)
According to [18], we know that φ(p) is a contraction. Then,
according to the Banach contraction theorem introduced in
[18], φ(p) has a unique fixed point that is globally asymp-
totically stable. Correspondingly, the inner iteration of the
proposed power control scheme via the Stackelberg game as
shown in Algorithm 1 converges. This completes the proof.
Note that we can always find a matrix norm of W to satisfy
‖W ‖ ≤ 1. Therefore, the convergence of the inner iteration of
the proposed power control scheme can always be guaranteed.
In the following, we briefly analyze the convergence of the
outer iteration of the proposed scheme. We know that the
utility function Uk is concave with respect to pk. Therefore,
the SUEs can gradually increase their transmit powers from
an arbitrary small number to their optima. Then, the obtained
transmit power of the SUEs can be used to determine the
transmit power of the MUE. When the transmit powers of
the SUEs have been increased to their optima, the optimal
transmit power of the MUE can then be determined accord-
ingly [19]. For the practical implementation of the proposed
Stackelberg game, the SUEs can find their optimal transmit
powers by gradually increasing the transmit power until the
utility function Uk reaches its maximum due to its concave
property. Correspondingly, the MUE can always achieve its
SE, i.e., the convergence of the outer iteration of the proposed
scheme can always be guaranteed.
E. The Existence and Uniqueness of the SE
SE offers a predictable and stable outcome about the trans-
mit power strategies that the MUE and each SUE will choose.
For the proposed Stackelberg game, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 4: One and only one SE point exists for the
proposed Stackelberg game.
Proof: Generally, we can obtain the SE for the proposed
Stackelberg game by finding the NE of its subgame. For
the proposed Stackelberg game, there is only one leader.
6Therefore, the best response of the leader can readily be
obtained by solving the optimization problem in (4). At the
followers’ side, the best response can be achieved by solving
the optimization problem in (6). Correspondingly, to prove this
theorem, we only need to prove that a unique NE point exists
for the subgame at the followers’ side.
It can be verified that the SUEs’ strategy space is a non-
empty and closed-bounded convex set in the Euclidean space.
Moreover, it can also be verified that the utility function
Uk(Pk,p−k, P0) is continuous with respect to Pk. In addition,
the utility function Uk(Pk,p−k, P0) is concave. According to
[20] and [21], we know that the NE exists if the players’
strategy space is a non-empty and closed-bounded set in the
Euclidean space and the utility function is continuous and
concave in its strategy space. Correspondingly, the existence
of the NE of the subgame at the followers’ side can be proved.
Regarding the uniqueness of the NE, we first state the
following lemma [22].
Lemma 1: For a game, if its feasible region is convex and
each players’ utility function is strictly convex, then the NE
of the game is unique.
Then, according to the above-mentioned discussions and the
proof of Theorem 1, we can easily verify the uniqueness of
the subgame at the followers’ side.
This completes the proof.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the performance of the proposed power
control scheme via a Stackelberg game is evaluated via sim-
ulations. In the simulations, the radii of the macrocell and
small cells are set to be 1000 m and 100 m, respectively.
The noise spectral density is set to −174 dBm/Hz. Unless
otherwise stated, we set λ = λ0 = λk,∀k. In the following, for
description convenience, we use U¯K , R¯K , and P¯K to denote
the average utility, the average transmit rate, and the average
transmit power of the considered SUEs, respectively, and we
use R¯ to denote the average transmit rate of the considered
MUE and SUEs.
In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we show the utility of the MUE and the
average utility of the SUEs of the proposed scheme versus the
number of iterations with different K for λ = 103 and PT = 0
dBm. As shown, the proposed scheme can converge to a stable
state quickly, which verifies that the proposed scheme can
converge to the SE. Moreover, both the utility of the MUE and
the average utility of the SUEs are observed to decrease with
the increased number of the SUEs, which can be attributed to
the increased cross-tier or co-tier interference.
In Fig. 4, we show the performance comparison between
our proposed scheme and the non-cooperative power control
scheme in [23] with λ = 103, PT = 0 dBm, and K = 4.
For description convenience, the utility of the MUE and the
average utility of the SUEs of the proposed Stackelberg-game-
based power control scheme are referred to as SG-MUE and
SG-SUE, respectively. The utility of the MUE and the average
utility of the SUEs of the non-cooperative-game-based power
control scheme in [23] are referred to as NCG-MUE and
NCG-SUE, respectively. As shown, the SG-MUE is close to
Fig. 2. The utility of the MUE versus the number of iterations
with different K.
Fig. 3. The average utility of the SUEs versus the number
of iterations with different K.
and slightly larger than the SG-SUE, and the NCG-MUE is
approximately zero and clearly smaller than the NCG-SUE.
This result verifies that the proposed scheme can significantly
improve the performance of the MUE.3
In Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, we show the transmit rate of the MUE
and the average transmit rate of the SUEs of the proposed
scheme versus PT with different K for λ = 103. As shown, the
transmit rate first increases with PT when PT is smaller than a
certain threshold value, and then it approaches a steady value.
When PT is sufficiently small, the MUE and the SUEs are
constrained by the maximum transmit power. Correspondingly,
their transmit rates are relatively small. As PT increases,
their transmit rates increase due to the larger transmit power
3Note here that the performance improvement is not absolutely free. There
is some system overhead between the leader and the followers in order to
realize the Stackelberg game in our proposed scheme. However, the quick
convergent property of our proposed scheme as illustrated in Fig. 2 and Fig.
3 indicates that the corresponding system overhead will be affordable.
7Fig. 4. The utility versus the number of iterations for different
schemes.
Fig. 5. The transmit rate of the MUE versus PT with different
K.
constraint. When PT is larger than a certain threshold value,
the transmit power will increase, but it will also simultaneously
cause more interference. Therefore, the transmit rate of the
MUE and that of the SUEs will both stop increasing.
In Fig. 7, we show the transmit rate of the MUE and the
average transmit rate of the SUEs versus PT with different
λ0 and λK for K = 4. As shown, the transmit rate of
the MUE (the average transmit rate of the SUEs) is larger
when λ0 (λK) is relatively small. The reason for this result
is that a smaller cost of the transmit power will stimulate
the corresponding player to employ a relatively large transmit
power, subsequently resulting in a larger transmit rate.
In Fig. 8, we show the average transmit rate of the MUE
and SUEs of the proposed scheme versus λ for K = 4 and
PT = 0 dBm. As shown, the average transmit rate remains at a
high value when λ is smaller than 30 dB, decreases gradually
with the increased λ, and finally remains at a small value. The
reason for this behavior is that the MUE or SUE will choose
Fig. 6. The average transmit rate of the SUEs versus PT with
different K.
Fig. 7. The transmit rate versus PT with different λ0 and
λK .
to decrease the transmit power and also the corresponding
transmit rate with the increased λ.
In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, we show the transmit power of the
MUE and the average transmit power of the SUEs versus PT
with different λ for K = 4. As shown, the transmit power
decreases with λ. Moreover, the transmit power increases with
PT when PT is smaller than 0 dBm and remains approximately
constant when PT is larger than 0 dBm. The reason for this
result is that the maximum transmit power constraint will have
no influence on the power control with a sufficiently large PT .
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have formulated a power control Stackel-
berg game for two-tier small-cell networks by considering both
the transmit rate and cost. The optimal transmit powers of the
MUE and SUEs have been obtained based on the backward
induction method. We have developed a two-layer iterative
8Fig. 8. The average transmit rate versus λ with different K.
Fig. 9. The transmit power of the MUE versus PT with
different λ.
power control scheme and proven the convergence of this
scheme. We have also shown the existence and uniqueness of
the SE in the formulated Stackelberg game. Numerical results
have been presented to demonstrate the desirable performance
of the proposed scheme. For future work, we would like to
explore power control with incomplete information for two-
tier small-cell networks.
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